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Physician Recruitment After
Hermann Hospital
Robert C. Louthian III*
Elizabeth M. Mills**

INTRODUCTION

Tax-exempt hospitals that offer recruitment or retention incentives to physicians have new standards with which to evaluate their existing or planned arrangements. On October 17,
1994, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released the longawaited "Hospital Physician Recruitment Guidelines" to the
public (the "Guidelines").' Several years in the making, the
Guidelines drifted about in recent times while the IRS was looking for an available vehicle for their release. Such a vehicle was
discovered in Hermann Hospital. This article will discuss the
significance of the vehicle-a closing agreement-used to release the Guidelines, summarize the evils the Guidelines are
designed to prevent, summarize previous guidance on this issue,
and address certain specific provisions of the Guidelines.
Hermann Hospital is a 560-bed tertiary-care hospital located
in Houston, Texas. As best as can be gleaned from various press
clippings and other public sources, Hermann Hospital was planning to issue tax-exempt bonds when concerns arose internally
with respect to certain physician recruitment and other prac* Robert Louthian is a senior associate in the health law department of McDermott, Will & Emery's Washington D.C. office. Mr. Louthian works primarily with
tax-exempt organizations, including hospitals and other health car providers, colleges
and universities, trade associations and private foundations. Prior to joining McDermott, Will & Emery, he was an attorney with the Internal Revenue Service Exempt
Organizations Technical Division.
** Elizabeth Mills is a partner in the health law department of McDermott, Will
& Emery's Chicago office. Ms. Mills concentrates her practice in tax-exempt organi-

zations, alternative delivery systems, joint ventures, affiliations, and health care reimbursement and regulation. She works primarily with hospitals and other institutional
health care providers, health maintenance organizations, universities, medical schools,
and physicians.
1. IRS Closing Agreement with Hermann Hospital with IRS' Physician Recruitment Guidelines, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1522 (Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter

Guidelines].
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tices.2 Presumably in order to receive an opinion of bond counsel, Hermann voluntarily approached the IRS to clear any
3
possible blight on its tax-exempt status.
The Guidelines are symbolic both of the IRS' accomplishments and short comings in the past ten years. For a variety of
reasons, the IRS has been unable to publish precedential guidance, such as revenue rulings, with respect to exempt organization issues for roughly the past fifteen years, despite the fact that
the exempt organization community has long since outgrown
the available guidance. In an effort to keep taxpayers informed
and in compliance with the tax laws, the IRS has released several nonprecedential documents to the public, such as the Hospital Audit Guidelines,4 the Examination Guidelines of Colleges
and Universities,5 and, most recently, the Guidelines. Although
these guidelines may not be relied upon by the IRS or taxpayers, they serve to inform the public of current IRS thinking on a
variety of issues. As such, the IRS deserves credit for keeping
the public informed despite its inability to publish precedential
guidance.
On the other hand, nonprecedential guidance can harm the
exempt community where the IRS takes positions that are contrary to the law, regulations, and earlier IRS positions, and enforces such positions without affording the public the
protections contained in the Administrative Procedure Act 6 or
the internal procedures associated with the release of revenue
rulings and procedures. The tax-exempt health care community
has been particularly vulnerable to recent, questionable IRS positions. Of particular note is the 20% "safe harbor" provision,
which provides that integrated health care delivery system enti2. See Joan Pryde, IRS Pact Lets Houston Hospital Keep Tax Exemption, Issue
Bonds, BOND BUYER, Oct. 19, 1994, at 1; Dan Monk, Family Docs Grapple with
Buyout Offers, CINCINNATI Bus. COURIER, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1; Annemarie Franczyk,
IRS Clamps Down on Incentives Hospitals Offer in Recruiting Doctors, BUFFALO
FIRsT-BUFFALO, Jan. 16, 1995, at 5.
3. The IRS took this opportunity to release the Guidelines. In order to place the
Guidelines in their proper perspective, it is important to understand the strong incentive that Hermann Hospital had in entering into the closing agreement and agreeing
to its publication. Without the closing agreement, it is possible that Hermann Hospital would not have been able to enter into the bond deal. Because Hermann Hospital
was in immediate need of a closing agreement, the IRS had significant leverage in
structuring the closing agreement. As will be discussed later, this becomes important
in determining the precedential value of the Guidelines.
4. I.R.S. Ann. 92-83; 1992-22 I.R.B. 59.
5. I.R.S. Ann. 94-112, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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ties seeking exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) should have no more than 20% physician
representation on their boards of directors.7 Although referred

to as a "safe harbor," it is currently being applied as a virtual
requirement for exemption under section 501(c)(3) for health
care organizations within an integrated delivery system.
The release of the Guidelines represents the latest good news/

bad news story from the IRS. The Guidelines are fairly comprehensive and demonstrate a commendable understanding of current physician recruitment and retention practices, as well as
other regulatory constraints faced by health care organizations.

Specifically, the Guidelines eliminate the need under. prior guidance to quantify benefit from recruitment activities while not
running afoul of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback provisions, 8 a virtually impossible exercise. However, the conclusions made in the Guidelines are often overbroad and, more
importantly, subject to significant abuse by IRS agents in the

course of an audit. They also illustrate the problems inherent in
7. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1994 EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM, at 228 (1994).
8. The anti-kickback laws, contained at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp.
1993), provide in part that:
(1) whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part [by the Medicare or Medicaid program], or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item
for which payment may be made in whole or in part [by the Medicare or
Medicaid program],
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part [by the Medicare or Medicaid program], or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part [by the Medicare or Medicaid program],
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988), the criminal fines that may be assessed have
been raised to $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for a corporation.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1995

3

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 4

a "safe harbor" type of guideline. 9 Where little precedent is
available, safe harbors often do not serve as a haven for the risk
averse, but instead tend to create an IRS-imposed industry
norm. This is especially true where the potential sanction for
any deviation from the safe harbor is revocation of tax-exempt
status-the exempt organization's death penalty.
Before discussing the Guidelines in detail, this article will address closing agreements in general and inurement and private
benefit issues as they relate to the Guidelines, for in order to
understand how to interpret the Guidelines, a thorough knowledge of the concepts of inurement and private benefit is crucial.
I.

CLOSING AGREEMENTS

Currently, revocation of tax-exempt status is the sole sanction
the IRS can impose to enforce the federal tax laws involving
charitable organizations. While the Department of the Treasury
has heavily lobbied Congress for the enactment of some type of
"intermediate sanctions" short of revocation of an organization's tax-exempt status, 10 to date, the Treasury's efforts have
proved unsuccessful.11 Revocation of exempt status, though
often proposed, is seldom recommended by the IRS as it represents a penalty that is often disproportionate to the alleged violation. In addition, it usually penalizes the community in which
the charitable organization sits rather than the alleged wrongdoer. Because the IRS lacks an intermediate sanction for orga9. While the Guidelines were not issued as a "safe harbor," it is likely that an
organization that follows the Guidelines will not have its recruitment practices challenged by the IRS.
10. See Statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary to the Treasurer, Tax
Policy, reprinted in 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 772 (1994).
11. Last year, both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee approved health reform packages that included "intermediate sanctions" for tax-exempt health care organizations. While the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance versions differed in several important respects, they both would
have imposed an excise tax on "insiders" who engage in "excess benefit transactions"
with affected exempt organizations. "Insiders" to whom the excise tax would apply
included the organization's directors, officers, and other persons in a position to exercise substantial influence over the organization, as well as the families of and entities
owned by such persons. In addition, during the debate on the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the House included intermediate sanctions for all section 501(c)(3)
organizations in their initial offer of compromise to the Senate. See H.R. REP. No.
601(I), 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, tit. XI, subtit. D, § 11402 (1994); Title VII of
Draft Senate Finance Committee Health Care Reform "Chairman'sMark"-Revenue
Provisions, 94 Tax Notes Today 126-9 (June 29, 1994). The Senate failed to include
the intermediate sanctions provision in its response to the House offer, thereby
preventing its enactment.
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nizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code, the IRS
has begun to enter into closing agreements with tax-exempt organizations on an increasingly frequent basis. Closing agreements vary widely, but their basic elements are often the same: a
tax-exempt organization agrees to pay a "penalty" in return for
the IRS not revoking the organization's tax-exempt status.
The authority granted to the IRS to enter into closing agreements is extremely broad. The Commissioner of the IRS, or her
delegate, has the authority to enter into closing agreements with
taxpayers for the purpose of settling any tax matter with a taxpayer for any tax period.12 Although closing agreements may
only resolve tax liabilities for closed taxable periods, they may
also be used to cover future years, although only with respect to
how a particular item will be treated, not the'actual amount of
tax owed. Finally, there is no requirement that a tax liability
actually exist for a prior period as a precondition for entering
into a closing agreement. The discretion to enter into closing
agreements lies solely with the Commissioner, but taxpayers
who voluntarily approach the IRS to settle a tax matter are seldom refused a request for an agreement.
Closing agreements between taxpayers and the IRS generally
are not made available to the public. However, there is no statutory or regulatory prohibition against either party requesting
that such document be made publicly available as a condition to
entering into the arrangement. Thus, the IRS was within its authority to require Hermann Hospital to agree to make its agreement publicly available. Nonetheless, if the IRS adopts such a
disclosure requirement as a matter of course with respect to
closing agreements or other settlements, it will constitute a
troubling erosion of the confidentiality provided by section 6103
13
of the Code.
A closing agreement between a taxpayer and the IRS has absolutely no binding effect on any party other than the taxpayer
entering into the closing agreement and the IRS. Therefore, the
Guidelines attached to the closing agreement may not be used
by the IRS against any other hospital. In fact, closing agreements have the same precedential value on organizations not
parties to the agreement as do private letter rulings-none. The
reason closing agreements are not precedential is obvious. Clos12. 26 U.S.C. § 7121 (1988). This is a generic provision used to settle tax matters
with taxable as well as tax-exempt organizations.
13.

26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988).

Published by LAW eCommons, 1995

5

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 4

ing agreements do not follow the applicable administrative procedures necessary to publish precedential guidance. In addition,
whatever facts motivated a taxpayer to enter into a closing
agreement are uniquely suited to that taxpayer and should not
be used as a basis for settling any tax matters of a different taxpayer. In Hermann Hospital's case, the closing agreement is devoid of any factual statement that would allow a basis for
meaningful comparison by a similar taxpayer.
Although the Guidelines have no binding effect on any parties other than Hermann Hospital and the IRS, they will likely
play a significant role in physician recruitment practices. First,
the Guidelines will provide an in terrorem effect on certain physician recruitment practices. Because the Guidelines indicate
that any deviation from the Guidelines may be considered inurement of net earnings or excessive private benefit, both of
which are grounds for revocation of exempt status, many organizations will hesitate to stray from their strict confines.
Second, although the Guidelines do not represent precedent,
IRS agents in the conduct of examinations will inevitably use
the Guidelines as a checklist for "appropriate" physician recruitment practices. Any recruitment or retention practice that differs from the Guidelines will likely be written up as a potential
revocation issue by the agent. Technically, this is not using the
Guidelines as precedent because the agent will only be raising
issues that could have been raised anyway. Thus, while the
Guidelines do not give the agent actual precedent, they do give
the agent significant leverage in pursuing a recruitment or retention issue. For example, the agent could use a particular recruitment incentive to propose revocation of exempt status and use
such proposed revocation to secure an agreement from the taxpayer that results in a greater amount of employment taxes being owed over the same period. While highly questionable, it is
not uncommon for an agent to threaten revocation, even when
based on positions of questionable merit, to extract higher settlement payments. Thus, it becomes imperative to have a firm
understanding of the precedential documents with respect to inurement and private benefit issues.
II.

INUREMENT AND PRIVATE BENEFIT

In order to understand the position of the IRS with respect to
physician recruitment practices, it is important to understand
two concepts unique to the charitable sector: inurement of net
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol4/iss1/3
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earnings and excessive private benefit. The presence of either
one of these elements is grounds for revocation of tax-exempt
status. The Guidelines emphasize this point in Paragraph Z,
wherein the closing agreement states that failure to comply with
any provision of the Guidelines may be found to constitute prohibited inurement and excessive private benefit that is inconsistent with tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.' 4
A.

Inurement

In order to be recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Code, an organization must demonstrate that it is organized and operated exclusively for charitable (or other exempt)
purposes and that no part of its net earnings inures to the benefit of any "private shareholder or individual.' 1 5 The words "private shareholder or individual" refer to persons having a
personal and private interest in the activities of the organization. 16 Individuals who possess the attributes of a "private
shareholder or individual" are commonly referred to as "insiders." The inurement proscription contained in section 501(c)(3)
is absolute. 17 Therefore, any finding of inurement is a complete
bar to exemption under section 501(c)(3).
Courts have long held that the payment of reasonable compensation to insiders does not constitute proscribed inurement
of net earnings.1 While taxable corporations have a specific
statutory provision limiting ordinary and necessary business deductions for compensation to reasonable amounts, 19 the exempt
organizations sector lacks a similar provision. Nonetheless, in
14. While Paragraph Z indicates that any deviation from the Guidelines may constitute inurement or substantial private benefit that is inconsistent with tax-exempt
status, the text of the closing agreement itself, in Paragraph 14, indicates that isolated
or inadvertent failures to comply with the Guidelines will not constitute noncompliance with the closing agreement; rather, the standard is a good faith effort to comply.
This illustrates the "safe harbor" nature of the Guidelines; deviation is not necessarily
inconsistent with exemption, but Hermann Hospital agreed not to deviate intentionally for the term of the closing agreement.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1), 1.501(c)(3)(1)(c)(2) (1990).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (1990).
17. See, e.g., Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.
Wash. 1963).
18. See, e.g., Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir.
1953).
19. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (Supp. 1993).
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Enterprise Railway Equipment Co. v. United States, 20 the court
applied the reasoning of section 162 to exempt organizations. 2 '
General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 38,32222 has been interpreted as greatly expanding the definition of "insider" for
purposes of the inurement proscription. In this memorandum,
the IRS Chief Counsel stated that Congress intended that the
inurement proscription apply to any individual who personally
profits from the organization. Using this definition, the IRS
concluded that a person serving in the role of administrator and
general counsel of a voluntary employee benefits association exempt under section 501(c)(9) of the Code clearly comes within
the inurement proscription. However, the GCM should not be
interpreted as creating a "per se" rule with respect to the inclusion of administrators and general counsel as insiders for purposes of the inurement proscription. The facts contained in the
memorandum laid a strong foundation for a finding of inurement. The particular individual involved received unreasonable
compensation both for himself and for his law firm, which administered the trust. Because the individual had a sufficient degree of control over the assets of the organization so as to cause
himself and his law firm to be unreasonably compensated, there
were sufficient facts to show that he had a "personal and private
interest" in the activities of the organization and, therefore,
could be considered an insider.
In GCM 39,49823 the Chief Counsel stated that, in the IRS'
opinion, recruited physicians as employees or as individuals with
a close professionalworking relationshipwith a hospital are persons who have a personal and private interest in the activities of
the hospital. Thus, such physicians are subject to the inurement
proscription. Stated otherwise, a physician staff member is considered to be an individual with significant influence over the
operation of a hospital and, therefore, an insider. In GCM

20. 161 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
21. There is substantial case law in the taxable sector regarding the reasonableness of compensation, which should be perused in the event an inurement charge is
made. See, e.g., Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983); Pacific
Grains, Inc. v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1968); Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
22. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,322 (Mar. 24, 1980). A GCM is a legal opinion of the
IRS Office of Chief Counsel. While instructive as to IRS policy, it has neither precedential value nor binding effect.
23. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986).
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39,670,24 the IRS again made the argument that an employee
was an insider for purposes of the inurement proscription.
In Senior Citizens of Missouri,Inc. v. Commissioner,25 the IRS
denied the organization's application for exemption on the basis
that the compensation paid to its employees constituted inurement of net earnings. The court, while upholding the denial of
the applicant's exempt status, based its opinion not on inurement grounds, but on the grounds that the compensation arrangement furthered to a substantial extent the private interests
of the employees. The issue of inurement was not even addressed by the court.
In GCM 39,862,26 the Chief Counsel elaborated on the rationale for considering physicians on the medical staff insiders with
respect to a hospital.
While most physicians on the medical staffs of the subject hospitals presumably are not employees and do not provide any
compensable services directly to the hospitals, they do have a
close professional working relationship with the hospitals. The
physicians have applied for and been granted privileges to admit and treat their private patients at the hospital. They are
bound by the medical staff bylaws, which may be viewed as a
constructive contract between them and the hospital. Individually, and as a group, they largely control the flow of patients
to and from the hospital and patients' utilization of hospital
services while there. Some may serve other roles at the hospital, such as that of27 part-time employee, department head,
Board member, etc.
The position taken in GCM 39,862, that physicians are to be
treated as insiders of an exempt hospital, seems to be counter to
the position taken in Rev. Rul. 69-383,28 which states in relevant
part that a hospital-based radiologist is not an insider for purposes of the inurement proscription. In this ruling, the hospital
entered into an agreement with the radiologist to compensate
him on the basis of a fixed percentage of the departmental income. Under the contract, the hospital agreed to provide space,
equipment, and supplies, and to make nonmedical personnel
available to the department of radiology. The hospital also
billed and collected the charges. In return, the radiologist
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (June 17, 1987).
56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (1988).
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991).
Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113.
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agreed to manage the department, participate in the hospital's
educational program, and perform all radiological services required by hospital patients, employees, and students. The
amounts charged to patients for services rendered were established by the hospital with the approval of the radiologist. The
hospital paid the radiologist a fixed percentage of the department's gross billings, adjusted by an allowance for bad debts,
which amount was not excessive when compared with the
amounts received by radiologists having similar responsibilities
and handling a comparable patient volume at other similar
hospitals.
Despite all of these factors, the ruling concluded that under
the circumstances described above, the radiologist did not control the organization and the agreement was at arm's length.
For those reasons, it held that the arrangement entered into between the hospital and the radiologist did not constitute inurement of net earnings to a private individual within the meaning
of Treasury Regulation sections 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 9
Clearly, the IRS was in a bind in attempting to reconcile the
position taken in Rev. Rul. 69-383 with its position in GCM
39,862. It resolved the dilemma in a masterly fashion; GCM
39,862 avoids the inconsistency by a de facto revocation of Rev.
Rul. 69-383. The GCM states that "[d]ue to Medicare changes,
the typical arrangement today provides for even hospital-based
physicians to bill separately for their professional services, while
the hospital bills separately for the technical component. Thus,
while never revoked, Rev. Rul. 69-383 has little relevance to
most hospital-physician relationships today ....
The first sentence is clearly true.31 The second sentence does
not necessarily follow. It does not represent the law as the
courts have ruled 32 or as the IRS has interpreted the inurement
proscription over the past 25 years.3 3 Irrespective of whether a
Id. at 114.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 11 (footnote omitted).
See Douglas M. Mancino, Nonexempt Uses of Tax-Exempt Hospital Bonds, 24
Hosp. LAW 73, 79-80 (1991).
J. HEALTH
32. See, &
e.g., Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 345-46
29.
30.
31.

(1980).

33.

See, e.g.,

INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL

pt. 7, ch. 770, subsec. 7751, ch. 300,

subsec. 382.41(6) (Mar. 12, 1982) ("the presence of a percentage compensation agreement will destroy an organization's exemption under IRC 501(c)(3) where such arrangement transforms the principal activity of the organization into a joint venture
between it and a group of physicians, or is merely a device for distributing profits to
persons in control") (emphasis added); Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Corn-
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GCM may be used to revoke a revenue ruling,34 the level of
influence an employee or doctor has over the hospital has not
changed so significantly to warrant a virtual per se rule that
medical staff doctors are insiders. What makes individuals insiders is their ability to divert assets to their private interests. The
IRS may be able to sustain a conclusion that the leading thoracic
surgeon in the country is an insider at that physician's hospital,
but a physician who merely has staff privileges has not done
enough to be considered an insider. To the extent Rev. Rul. 69383 implies that a staff physician is not an insider with respect to
a hospital, absent other facts that demonstrate control, the conclusion in the revenue ruling should remain in full force.
In support of its per se approach with respect to physicians as
insiders, the IRS often cites certain court cases to support its
position. However, these cases are factually distinguishable
from most situations encountered today in the health care area.
For example, in Lowry Hospital Association v. Commissioner,35
the IRS successfully argued that the hospital in question was not
entitled to exemption because of the inurement of its net earnings to insiders. The hospital in Lowry was created by Dr.
Lowry, who also owned the building, either directly or as trustee
for his children, in which the hospital leased space. Dr. Lowry
was a principal in the Lowry-Henshaw Clinic, which also leased
space in Dr. Lowry's building. The clinic and the hospital
shared numerous services and facilities. In fact, if Dr. Lowry
referred a patient to the hospital, the patient received a single
bill that included not only Dr. Lowry's fees, but the hospital's
fees as well. Although the hospital had an "open" medical staff
policy, 92% of patients during the five years in question were
treated by Dr. Lowry or his clinical partner. From these facts,
among others, the court concluded that actual inurement existed
and, therefore, the hospital was not entitled to exemption under
section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In dicta, the court added the following note:
[O]ur concern extends beyond these specifically identifiable
instances of private inurement. Where a doctor or group of
doctors dominate the affairs of a corporate hospital otherwise
exempt from tax, the courts have closely scrutinized the underlying relationship to insure that the arrangements permit a
missioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960); Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.
141 (1958).
34. In these authors' views, a GCM cannot be used to revoke a revenue ruling.
35. 66 T.C. 850 (1976).
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conclusion that the corporate hospital is organized and operated exclusively
for charitable purposes without any private
36
inurement.
There have been other cases involving hospitals controlled by
doctors in which the IRS' revocation of exempt status was upheld by the courts. But, like Lowry, the facts in those cases
showed actual
control by the physician(s) over the affairs of the
37
hospital.
It appears that the IRS is attempting to impose a self-dealing
type of prohibition against transactions between a hospital and a
physician similar to the prohibition contained in section 4941 of
the Code. 38 In 1969, Congress imposed a series of excise taxes
to curtail perceived abuses in the private foundation area. One
provision prohibits virtually all dealings between a private foundation and a "foundation manager." A foundation manager, a
statutorily defined term, includes an officer, director, or trustee
of a foundation or an individual with similar powers. 39 It is interesting to note that even under the more restrictive provisions
regulating private foundations, a physician would not be considered a foundation manager unless he or she had the powers of a
director, officer, or trustee. Thus, without a legislative mandate,
the IRS appears to be advancing a more restrictive policy in the
hospital-physician area than in the private foundation area.
Absent facts that demonstrate a hospital has entered into a
sharing of net earnings with physicians, or that physicians exercise actual control over the operations of a hospital, a physician
should not be considered an insider for purposes of the inurement proscription. The per se argument is even more tenuous in
the context of a newly recruited physician who has no control
over the affairs of the hospital.4 0
B. Private Benefit
An entity is not organized or operated exclusively for exempt
purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.4 1
36. Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., Maynard Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1006 (1969); Sonora
Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519 (1966), aff'd, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1968); Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 4941 (1988).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 4946(b) (1988).

40. We note that it is not clear why the IRS singles out physicians for its per se
analysis as opposed to ministers, collegiate athletic coaches, or others who exhibit
similar "controls" over certain activities of exempt organizations.

41.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1990).
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Thus, in order to be exempt, it must establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or creator's family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.42 All activities of a charitable
organization result in some type of private benefit to individuals. In order to comply with section 501(c)(3) of the Code, the
organization must demonstrate that the private interests served
by its activities are "incidental" to the exempt, public purposes
of the organization.
The IRS employs a qualitative/quantitative analysis to determine whether an activity is incidental to public purposes.
Although seldom challenged by practitioners, the qualitative/
quantitative analysis is not a construct of the statute, the regulations, or the courts, but a creation of the Office of Chief Counsel
of the Internal Revenue Service. In GCM 37,789, the IRS
stated that the term "incidental," as used in the regulations, has
both qualitative and quantitative connotations. To be qualitatively incidental, a private benefit must occur as a necessary concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large; in other
words, the benefit to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting private individuals. To be quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be insubstantial when viewed in relation
to the public benefit conferred by the organization's activities.43
The courts have not adopted the qualitative/quantitative test
employed by the IRS. Instead, cases involving questions of private benefit examine the activities of the organization as a
whole in determining whether an organization serves a public
rather than a private interest. For example, in American Cam4 4 the Tax Court stated that to
paign Academy v. Commissioner,
demonstrate that an organization operates primarily for exempt
purposes, the organization must establish that no more than an
insubstantial part of its activities furthers a nonexempt purpose.
Likewise, in Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner,4 the Tax
Court examined the overall purpose served by the activities of
the organization rather than the individual sales activities for
particular artists who made up the organization.
42. Id.
43. See generally Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).
44. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
45. 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
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Some private benefit is present in all typical hospital-physician relationships, such as physicians' use of hospital facilities at
no cost to provide services to private patients for which they
earn a fee. The IRS recognized that this type of private benefit
is incidental to the overwhelming public benefit that results
from having the combined resources of the hospital and its professional staff available to serve the public. 46 Given this recognition by the IRS, it is difficult to conceive how the IRS now
proposes in the Guidelines that the payment of a single retention incentive to a physician outweighs the overwhelming public
benefit served by the physician-hospital relationship. IRS officials recently made public statements to the effect that new physicians may not be treated as insiders until after they have been
granted staff privileges. However, the payment of retention incentives, as contrasted with the payment of recruiting incentives,
will still be subject to the more restrictive, and potentially more
dangerous, inurement analysis if the IRS' view of physicians as
"insiders" is sustained.
III.

PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT

Prior to the Guidelines, the primary guidance for tax-exempt
hospitals in physician recruitment was GCM 39,498.47 While
GCM 39,498 did not announce a definite conclusion, it was read
by most practitioners and hospitals by negative inference to define permissible practices. In GCM 39,498, the IRS described a
tax-exempt hospital's physician recruitment program, which included guaranteed minimum annual income for two years with
no obligation by the physician to repay subsidies out of income
earned after the contract's two-year period, and concluded that
the program could adversely affect exemption.48
One year later, the IRS, in response to a wave of criticism,
released GCM 39,674, 49 which clarified the position taken in
GCM 39,498. In GCM 39,674, the IRS stated:
[W]hether a particular compensation plan adversely affects an
organization's exempt status is an inherently factual question.
So long as the compensation plan is not inconsistent with ex46. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991).
47. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986).
48. The subsidies could result in the physician's private interests being served
other than incidentally and in inurement of the hospital's net earnings because it had
not been demonstrated that all possible subsidies paid under the recruitment program
would constitute reasonable compensation.
49. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,674 (June 17, 1987).
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empt status as discussed above, is the result of arms length
bargaining and the compensation under the plan, as well as all
other compensation provided, is reasonable, the plan should
not jeopardize the exempt status of the organization ...
GCM 39498 . . . was not intended to create a negative presumption with respect to whether the compensation provided
under any particular Plan of compensation is reasonable, nor
did it intend to suggest that the Service will not issue advance
rulings on issues other than the reasonableness of the compensation. On this issue, GCM 39498 simply stated that the Service cannot50 determine, in advance, whether compensation is
reasonable.

GCM 39,674 clarified that the negative implications of GCM
39,498 were based on the IRS' ruling procedures rather than disapproval of physician recruitment in general.
GCM 39,498 expressed general approval of physician recruitment activities and outlined the analysis to be used in their
evaluation.
[Tihe Hospital's proposed revised guaranteed minimum annual income contract must be examined to determine the effect, if any, on the Hospital's exclusive pursuit of its charitable
purpose. We view the question of subsidies under the Hospital's physician recruitment program to be essentially a question of whether a given compensation arrangement comports
with the requirements of exemption.
In principle we agree that the Hospital must offer incentives or
inducements to attract qualified physicians needed in a particular area of specialization to enable the Hospital to provide
quality health care.5 1
The IRS in its analysis pointed out that there was no ceiling
on amounts of subsidies to be paid, other than the total annual
income guaranteed, and that there was no requirement that the
physician provide further services or continue to benefit the hospital after the expiration of the two-year guarantee period.
Finally,
[T]he method of determining the amount of subsidies to be
paid here bears no discernible direct relation to the value of a
particular physician to the Hospital. Such subsidies may vary
in amount based not on factors directly related to benefits to
the Hospital, e.g., increased efficiency or enhanced productiv50. Id. at 17-18.
51. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498, at 6, 7.
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ity for the Hospital because of his presence in the hospital's
medical service area, but rather on factors that relate principally to the physician's performance in his or her "private"
medical practice. Thus, it seems likely that amounts to be paid
(and possibly not repaid) as subsidies may fall outside the
range of reasonable compensation for the benefit to the Hospital of the doctor's relocation .... 52
This analysis required tax-exempt hospitals to attempt to
quantify and rank the benefits of various physicians' presence in
the community and on the medical staff. This approach is in
most cases impossible to reconcile with the prohibitions of the
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback laws, because no antikickback
"safe harbors" addressing physician recruitment exist.53 A physician recruitment safe harbor was included in draft
safe harbors informally circulated by the Office of Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services in
August 1988. If promulgated, this safe harbor would have permitted benefits to physicians newly in practice in the area.
However, it was not in the published proposed 54 or final 55 safe
harbor regulations. Among additional safe harbors issued in
proposed form on September 21, 199356 was one protecting physician recruitment arrangements that provide benefits for no
more than three years to recruit new physicians to rural areas,
provided certain other safeguards are satisfied. This regulation
has not yet been adopted in final form.
GCM 39,862 intimated but did not explicitly state that the
IRS recognized the inconsistency between the analysis in GCM
39,498 and the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback provisions
and planned to resolve this conflict by eliminating institutional
benefit to the hospital as an acceptable benefit in the weighing
process. GCM 39,862 did not, however, indicate that the
strained and illogical compensation and quantification of benefit
analysis set forth in GCM 39,498 could be abandoned altogether. This nonetheless is the approach of the Guidelines. So
long as the physician is new in practice and needed in the community, incentives are permissible.
52. Id. at 9.
53. No remuneration may be offered, solicited, paid, or received in exchange for a
patient referral for a service for which Medicare or Medicaid may pay. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
54. 54 Fed. Reg. 8,033 (Jan. 23, 1989).
55. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (July 29, 1991).
56. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008, 49,010 (Sept. 21, 1993).
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IV. THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines define both the physicians to whom retention
and recruitment incentives may be provided and the types of
permissible incentives. Significantly, the Guidelines apply only
to incentives provided to nonemployee physicians.57 In addition, while not specifically stated, the Guidelines do not apply to
a state or county-owned hospital provided such hospital operates as an instrumentality of the state government, since the sole
sanction the IRS has in its arsenal is revocation of exempt status. Unless the state or county hospital has applied for and received recognition of tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of
the Code, the IRS has no sanction against "impermissible" incentives offered by such hospitals.
A.

Retention Incentives

The Guidelines do not permit any retention incentives of any
kind to be provided to existing physicians. An "existing physician" is defined as a nonemployee
physician having medical staff
58
privileges at a hospital.
Prior to the Guidelines, the IRS issued rulings where, at least
implicitly, it recognized that retention of existing physicians
would not result in inurement or substantial private benefit.59
The absolute nature of the Guideline's prohibition on retention
incentives reflects the IRS' belief that significant abuses exist in
this type of incentive arrangement. Unfortunately, the absolute
prohibition on retention incentives may lead to certain anomalous results. For example, if an existing nonemployee physician
is planning to leave a particular hospital community, the hospital is prohibited by the Guidelines from paying a retention incentive to the physician. After the physician's departure, the
same hospital may pay the equivalent amount, if not more, to
recruit a new physician to the area to replace the lost specialist.
The likelihood of the IRS being able to sustain the revocation
of a hospital's tax-exempt status in the courts on the sole basis
of the payment of a retention incentive approaches that of a lottery contestant's chance of winning. Nonetheless, because retention incentives to existing physicians are strictly prohibited
by the Guidelines, the presence of such arrangements is guaran57.
58.
59.
(Dec.

Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1522.
Id.
See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-23-091 (Mar. 15, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-08-070
2, 1987).
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teed to result in intense IRS scrutiny in the event of an audit. If
a hospital is considering the payment of a retention incentive to
an existing physician, it must be able to document the community's continuing need for the particular specialty or services of
the physician.
B.

Recruitment Incentives

Recruitment incentives are permissible only if provided to a
"permissible recruit," defined as a physician who either (1) is a
recent graduate of a residency or fellowship program, whether
or not in the hospital's community, or (2) has not previously
practiced in the hospital's community or been affiliated with another hospital serving all or part of the hospital's community
(defined as the hospital's primary and secondary service area).6 °
Even if a new recruit is a "permissible recruit," recruitment
incentives will not be considered permissible unless there is a
demonstrable community need for the physician, as evidenced
by one or more of the following:
a. a population to physician ratio in the community that is
deficient in the particular specialty (with reference to the ideal
ratio set forth in [Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Council] reports) of the physician being recruited;
b. demand for a particular medical service in the community
coupled with a documented lack of availability of the service
or long waiting periods for the service, if the physician is being
recruited to increase availability of that service;
c. [federal] designation of the community (or that portion of
the community that the physician is serving) at the time the
recruitment agreement is executed as a Health Professional
Shortage Area ... ;
d. a demonstrated reluctance of physicians to relocate at the
Hospital due to the Hospital's physical location (this criterion
is intended to refer to a hospital located in a rural or economically-disadvantaged inner-city area);
e. a reasonably expected reduction in the number of physicians of that specialty serving in the Hospital's service area
due to the anticipated retirement within the next three year
period of physicians presently in the community; or
f. a documented lack of physicians serving indigent or Medicaid patients within [the] Hospital's service area, provided that
60.

Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1522.
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newly-recruited physicians commit to serving6 1 a substantial
number of Medicaid and charity care patients.
The Guidelines do recognize that courting a "permissible recruit" to join an existing physician's established medical practice
is permissible. 62 However, in this instance, the hospital may pay
no more than fifty percent of the recruiting costs incurred for
that physician. The Guidelines further specify that recruiting
fees or costs may not be paid to existing physicians under any
circumstances, although such fees may be paid to outside search
consultants.63 If this provision is intended to mean something
other than prohibiting payments of fees to existing physicians
specifically for their efforts in recruiting, it is unclear how this is
to be applied to existing recruitment practices.
There does not appear to be any legal basis for the fifty-percent limit on payment of recruiting cost expenditures. In addition, with respect to the payment of recruiting fees to outside
search consultants, if the expenditure itself furthers a charitable
purpose, it is difficult to imagine how the identity of the recipient somehow changes the nature of the payment. Stated otherwise, if an exempt organization is allowed to expend the funds
to attract a physician to the area, why should the IRS care who
receives the funds as long as these amounts further exempt purposes? These decisions are better left to the board of directors
of the hospital rather than to IRS agents. Again, it appears as if
the IRS is attempting to impose an absolute "self-dealing type"
prohibition on transactions between exempt hospitals and physicians similar to the prohibitions contained in the various legislative proposals discussed earlier.
C. Permissible Incentives
1.

Income Guarantees

Permissible incentives include reasonable income guarantees,
offered to "permissible recruits," provided:
(a) such income guarantee is for a period of two years or
less;
(b) no off-agreement benefits are offered or provided;
(c) all terms are agreed to in advance in writing and are not
modified over the life of the agreement;
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1524.
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(d) in the event periodic income guarantee advances are
made to the physician, they will be structured as a loan or
loans bearing a reasonable rate of interest with any loan terms
or loan forgiveness complying with [particular provisions];
(e) where the income guarantee is for a net income amount,
a reasonable fixed ceiling amount must be placed on allowable
expenses and amounts for which advances may be made; [and]
(f) the guarantee represents all or part64of a compensation
package that is reasonable in its entirety.
Even after the Guidelines, it appears that forgivable guarantees remain somewhat risky income vehicles for recruitment
plans. However, if structured as fully repayable loans, such arrangements could continue to be a popular recruitment incentive and avoid intense IRS scrutiny.65 In light of the Guidelines,
and the above-discussed GCMs, the use of subsidy caps is highly
recommended. In the absence of subsidy caps, additional services should be required of the physician in return for a clause
that does not oblige repayment. Ideally, such additional services
could be targeted to alleviate a demonstrable community need.
2.

Loans

Loans, lines of credit, and loan guarantees offered to physicians are among the list of "permissible incentives," but only if
such loans, lines of credit, or loan guarantees, are (a) documented and evidenced by an executed promissory note; (b) adequately secured; and (c) bear interest at a reasonable rate
reflecting market conditions (for example, prime plus one or
two percent, or the applicable federal rate).66
Further,
[a]ny loan forgiveness component [must] be conditioned upon
the continued presence of the physician in practice in the community and [must] be rateable for a period of not less than
four years, with the time period specified by contract at the
time the loan or loan guarantee is made. A demonstrable need
for the particular physician and the amount of the particular
incentive [must] be evidenced when provision is made for forgiveness of a loan.6 7

64. Id. at 1523.
65. When income guarantees are fully repayable, they are in essence a line of
credit with draw-down amounts measured by practice income deficits, and to call
them income guarantees is really a misnomer.
66. Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1523.
67. Id. at 1522-23 (emphasis added).
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Because the Guidelines list loans as incentives that can be
provided to permissible recruits, they can be interpreted to suggest that loans, even interest-bearing, fully repayable loans, may
not be provided to existing physicians. However, this conclusion
is contrary to logic and precedent. If a loan is provided on an
arm's length basis, no nonmarket compensation or benefit is being provided. Loans by a hospital to a physician are always suspect in the eyes of the IRS, but are grudgingly accepted when
they meet the above conditions. For example, in the Hospital
Audit Guidelines, the IRS permitted loans to existing physicians
provided that such loans met the above conditions, with the exception of the four-year requirement for any loan forgiveness.68
The Hospital Audit Guidelines warn examiners to be alert only
for below-market loans. Cases citing loans as evidence of inurement or private benefit involved low-interest loans or loans on
other favorable terms. 69
As with income guarantees, the IRS would be hard pressed to
sustain a proposed revocation of a hospital's tax-exempt status
on the basis that it provided a loan to an existing physician that
was documented, was secured, and bore a reasonable rate of interest. If, however, the tax-exempt organization makes repeated
loans to the same physician, even if under the above conditions,
the IRS may have a stronger argument that (1) the physician is
an "insider" and (2) the insider is using the assets of the taxexempt organization for personal gain. In this situation, inurement may be found.70
3.

Signing Bonuses or Other Bonus Payments

The Guidelines provide that signing bonuses or other bonus
payments are not permissible incentives under any circumstance. 1 This prohibition is another significant departure from
earlier IRS positions. In GCM 39,498, the IRS stated that a hospital may pay a one-time recruitment bonus or incentive provided the amount is determined not by reference to services to
be rendered, but by reference to the value assigned to recruiting
a particular physician to the medical service area.7 2 In fact, bo68. I.R.S. Ann. 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59.
69. See Orange County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1602
(1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990); Lowry Hosp. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 850 (1976).
70. See generally, Lowry Hosp., 66 T.C. 850.
71. Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1523.
72. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498, at 9 (Jan. 28, 1986).
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nuses are merely another form of compensation. Because the
Guidelines permit the guarantee of reasonable market compensation for a permissible recruit, payment of a part of that reasonable compensation in the form of a signing bonus should not
lead to a finding of inurement.
4.

Other Types of Incentives

Permissible incentives to a permissible recruit include the
payment of reasonable, actual moving expenses and relocation
73
costs, and reimbursement of interview travel expenses.
The following incentives are permissible only if no comparable and related value is otherwise provided to the permissible recruit through an alternative incentive mechanism, such as an
income guarantee or a forgiven loan:
a. Reasonable subsidies paid or provided, or other similar financing arrangement, for medical office space rent, overhead
expenses (such as utilities), or rental of equipment for a permissible recruit; but no such subsidy may be provided unless
the rental amount is (but for the subsidy) at fair rental value,
and in no event may such subsidy be provided for more than
two years.
b. Reasonable subsidized equipment purchases or other
assistance in acquiring equipment on behalf of a permissible
recruit, but only if free or reduced cost use by the physician
does not exceed two years. If title is transferred to the physician at the end of the period of free or reduced cost use, [the]
Hospital will receive payment for such equipment's then fair
market value from the physician.
c. No assistance in acquiring equipment or space may be provided if it entails a conveyance or lease of such equipment or
office space with a leaseback to [the] Hospital.74
The "payment or subsidized provision of private practice
start-up or maintenance assistance, such as consulting services to
assist in practice management, or other practice management
design plans," is also not permissible "if an income guarantee
has been or will be provided to the same physician. '75 By negative inference, such benefits should be permissible if no income
guarantee has been provided.
73.

Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1523.

74.
75.

Id.
Id.
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Permissible Obligations of Physicians

Even though an incentive may be permissible, the incentive
arrangement may only obligate the physician for certain specified duties. These allowable obligations include:
a. relocation to service area of Hospital;
b. establishment of a full-time private practice;
c. continued presence in the community for a specified period;
d. maintenance of license to practice;
e. acceptance of Medicaid and charity patients;
f. emergency room duty or other rotations;
g. performance of community or medical teaching;
h. performance of necessary administrative duties;
i. maintenance of staff privileges; and
j. maintenance of a practice in the specialty for which
recruited.7 6

However, the hospital may not condition incentives on "a
requirement or understanding that the physician admit or refer
patients" to it, nor may it prohibit or restrict the physician's
ability "to obtain or maintain staff privileges at other hospitals
77
or to treat patients at or admit patients to other hospitals.
6.

Impermissible Incentives

The Guidelines also detail certain incentives that are not permissible under any circumstances. Permissible incentives do not
include: (a) "travel and continuing education expenses for any
non-employee physician where such expenses are primarily related to the physician's private practice of medicine"; (b) "Hospital subsidization of salary and benefit costs for the support
personnel of a non-employee physician in his or her private
practice"; and (c) "the payment or provision, directly or indirectly, of malpractice insurance for the current private practice
of a non-employee physician." However, "[c]overage with respect to a physician's bona fide duties as Medical Director for
[the] Hospital, or any other activity undertaken for or on behalf
of the Hospital that is distinct from his or her private practice, is
permissible. 78
76.

Id. at 1522.

77. Id.
78.

Id. at 1523.
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Further, permissible incentives do not include parking, telephone or car allowances, health insurance
expenses, medical so79
ciety dues, subsidies, or licensing fees.
7.

Procedural Requirements

The Guidelines also impose several procedural requirements
on hospitals with respect to the payment of recruitment incentives. First, a physician who receives incentives other than a
loan (or other type of line of credit), actual moving expenses, or
interview travel expenses must agree to allow the exempt hospital to conduct a periodic accounting and inspect the physician's
financial records and books.8 0 If the hospital pays for actual
moving expenses, travel costs, and/or interview expenses, the
hospital must obtain documentation of expenses from the physician prior to providing the allowed reimbursements.
Second, while a hospital's management may negotiate recruitment agreements, the Guidelines require approval by the hospital board and review by the hospital's legal counsel or tax
advisor before it executes the recruitment incentive for each individually recruited physician. 8 This requirement appears to be
overly burdensome given the number of physicians that are recruited by larger hospitals. Nonetheless, board approval of a recruitment program and periodic review of certain incentive
agreements would be prudent.
In addition, the Guidelines require that each recruitment arrangement contain a provision that the hospital may "terminate
the agreement and recover from the physician any payment that
is determined by a court or governmental agency to be illegal or
inconsistent with [the hospital's] tax-exempt status. ' 82 Including
such a provision is prudent.
Finally, the Guidelines require hospitals to report all incentives provided to physicians on a Form W-2 or Form 1099, as
appropriate. IRS officials have indicated that there may be
widespread failure to comply with reporting requirements.83
79. The exception is if these expenses are related to a physician's bona fide duties
as the hospital's Medical Director or other duties the physician undertakes on behalf
of the hospital that are distinct from the physician's private practice. Id.
80. Id. at 1522.
81. Id. at 1524.
82. Id.

83.

See, e.g., Report on Remarks of Philip M. Corn, Special Assistant, Office of

the Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, in 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
37 (1994).
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Health care organizations face two difficult questions with respect to physician recruitment after Hermann Hospital. First,
what should a section 501(c)(3) health care organization do with
respect to its existing recruitment or retention incentives that
may deviate from the parameters of the Guidelines? Second,
how should future recruitment and retention incentives for physicians be structured?
The best advice for section 501(c)(3) health care organizations
is to reexamine their current recruitment and retention policies
in light of the Guidelines. For those practices that deviate from
the Guidelines, an organization has three principal choices: (1)
continue the current practice; (2) restructure the practice to conform to the Guidelines and tell no one; or (3) contact the IRS to
alert them that concerns exist with respect to a particular recruitment or retention practice and that the hospital would like
to resolve any potential issues, possibly through a closing agreement. If an organization is contemplating the issuance of taxexempt bonds in the near future and physician relationships deviate substantially from the Guidelines, the third alternative
should be given serious consideration. If bonds are not contemplated, the best alternative depends on a variety of factors including an organization's risk tolerance and the existence of any
facts that would support the legitimacy of recruitment or retention practice.
If the Guidelines are as their name suggests, "guidelines," recruitment and retention practices that are not specifically excluded may be permissible. For example, in discussing
permissible incentives, the Guidelines state that even if a physician is a permissible recruit, an incentive will not be considered
"permissible" unless there is a demonstrable community need
84
for the physician, as evidenced by one or more of six factors.
It is doubtful that the six factors listed cover all potential situations where significant demonstrable need for such a physician
exists.
In any tax challenge to a recruitment or an incentive practice,
a hospital should focus its defense on the law as it relates to
private inurement. A strong legal argument can be made that a
physician with medical staff privileges may not be considered an
"insider" for purposes of the inurement proscription solely on
84. See generally section IV(B) above.
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the basis of such privileges. The IRS faces an even tougher battle trying to label a newly recruited physician as an "insider."
Once inurement is no longer a potential issue, the analysis
shifts to whether the recruitment or retention incentive confers
a substantial private benefit on the physician. There is no direct
case law on this issue. There is also little IRS precedent in the
area, although what is there favors the hospital more than the
IRS. If the Guidelines are to be applied broadly, their conclusion that a single recruitment incentive could constitute a substantial private benefit justifying revocation is overbroad. To
the extent that "impermissible" recruitment incentives are a frequent practice of a hospital, the IRS would have a stronger case.
In structuring recruitment and retention packages, a hospital
should not let the Guidelines dictate programs that the hospital
believes to be in its best interests. To the extent a hospital deviates from the Guidelines, it must be able to demonstrate why the
incentive was paid, the relationship between the incentive and
the needs of the community, and the terms or conditions of the
incentive, if any. Hospital board involvement, either on a policy
basis or on a case-by-case basis (particularly for those incentives
that fall outside of the confines of the Guidelines) is essential, as
is legal or tax advisor consultation. Given recent IRS pronouncements, hospitals with community-based boards may have
an easier time justifying recruitment and retention incentives
than those with less community involvement in governance.
CONCLUSIONS

The Guidelines represent the latest assault by the IRS in the
recent war it has waged against the not-for-profit hospital community. From a business standpoint, the Guidelines could not
have arrived at a worse time. Not-for-profit hospitals are finding it harder than ever to compete for physicians with for-profit
hospital chains that may offer more exciting and potentially
more lucrative equity incentive packages, among other arrangements. In fact, as not-for-profit hospitals continue to be unable
to attract or retain physicians, the Guidelines may serve ultimately to create the very medical services shortages required in
order to justify the recruitment and retention practices they seek
to curtail.
Recently, James McGovern, Assistant Commissioner, Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, stated that the IRS
does not intend to apply the Guidelines across the board to all
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hospitals.8 5 While this provides some level of comfort, the statement appears fundamentally inconsistent with the IRS-mandated public disclosure of the Guidelines in the first place. In
essence, it sounds like the proverbial physician holding a threeinch hypodermic needle, stating: "This won't hurt a bit."
EPILOGUE

As this article was going to publication, the IRS released to
the tax media a proposed revenue ruling regarding physician recruitment. 86 Because the proposed revenue ruling deals with
only five highly specific examples, an understanding of the Hermann Hospital Guidelines remains crucial to tax-exempt
hospitals.
Like a phoenix from the ashes, the proposed revenue ruling
represents a bold move from the IRS for not only reviving
(hopefully) its revenue rulings program, but for issuing a proposed revenue ruling in an area as controversial as physician recruitment and, in addition, requesting public comments on the
proposed ruling. While some tax practitioners have already
questioned the value of the proposed revenue ruling by arguing
that its examples are too limiting, such arguments miss the
point. To the extent this proposed revenue ruling reactivates the
long-dormant exempt organizations revenue rulings program,
the fact that it may be considered too narrow is a small price to
pay. Further, criticisms that its examples are too narrow misunderstand the nature, purpose, and use of revenue rulings.
I.

BACKGROUND

As with the Guidelines, the proposed revenue ruling has no
precedential value and technically may not be used by the IRS
to attack, or by exempt organizations to defend, a particular
physician recruitment program or incentive. Nonetheless, a recruitment program or incentive that falls within its ambit should
not invoke IRS scrutiny. Once the proposed revenue ruling is
issued in final form, however, the revenue ruling will be binding
on the IRS. 87 Therefore, recruitment practices that fall squarely
within the examples provided in the revenue ruling will be
85. See IRS's McGovern Downplays Hermann HospitalClosing Agreement, 10 Ex1289 (1994).
86. I.R.S. Ann. 95-25, 1995-14 I.R.B. 11 (Mar. 15, 1995).
87. Although revenue rulings are not binding on the courts, they are given significant deference in court opinions.
EMPT ORG. TAX REV.
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treated by the IRS in accordance with the rationale and conclusions found in the revenue ruling.
The reason the Guidelines remain relevant even after the revenue ruling is finalized lies in the nature of a revenue ruling. A
revenue ruling does not preclude organizations from engaging in
activities that do not fall squarely within the ruling's ambit. Specifically, merely because a particular recruitment practice includes facts not included in the revenue ruling does not mean
that it is an improper activity. The revenue ruling serves as an
indication of the particular facts the IRS views as important and
a precedential safe harbor for those practices that fall squarely
within its terms. In the real world, few practices, whether it be
recruitment activities or unrelated business activities, ever fall
squarely within the provisions of revenue rulings.
II.

THE PROPOSED REVENUE RULING

The proposed revenue ruling sets forth five situations involving a tax-exempt hospital and a particular physician recruitment
incentive. In the first four situations, the recruitment incentive
is determined not to jeopardize the hospital's exempt status. In
the fifth situation, a court has determined that the recruitment
program violates the anti-kickback statute and the resultant
conviction leads to revocation of the hospital's tax-exempt
status.
Situation One
Hospital A is located in a rural county. The United States
Public Health Service designated the rural area as a Health Professional Shortage Area for primary medical care professionals.
The hospital recruited a physician, Physician M, who had recently completed a residency in obstetrics/gynecology; the physician was not on the medical staff of Hospital A. Hospital A
recruited this physician to maintain a full-time practice in obstetrics/gynecology and to become a nonemployee member of
the hospital's medical staff. Pursuant to a written agreement
that was negotiated at arm's length, Hospital A provided this
new physician with a recruitment incentive package. The agreement was approved by the board of directors of the hospital (or
its designees); no off-agreement incentives were provided.
Pursuant to this agreement, the hospital paid the recruited
physician a one-time $5,000 bonus to the physician, paid one
year of the physician's malpractice insurance premiums, prohttp://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol4/iss1/3
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vided the physician office space for three years in a hospitalowned building at a rental rate below market value, and guaranteed the physician's residential mortgage. Pursuant to a documented agreement, the hospital provided unspecified start-up
financial assistance at terms that were commercially reasonable.
Situation Two
Hospital B, located in an economically depressed inner-city
area, performed a community needs assessment. The assessment concluded that (1) there was a shortage of pediatricians in
its service area, and (2) Medicaid patients found it particularly
difficult to obtain pediatric services. Physician N, a pediatrician,
practiced outside of the service area for Hospital B and was not
on its medical staff. Hospital B recruited the pediatrician to
relocate to the city for the purpose of maintaining a full-time
pediatric practice in its service area, becoming a nonemployee
member of its medical staff, and treating a reasonable number of
patients on Medicaid. Pursuant to a written agreement that was
negotiated at arm's length, Hospital B provided this pediatrician
with a recruitment package; the agreement was approved by the
board of directors of the hospital (or its designees). No offagreement incentives were provided.
Pursuant to the agreement, the hospital reimbursed the physician for moving expenses (as defined in section 217(b) of the
Code 88 ) as well as the expenses of the professional liability "tail"
coverage from the pediatrician's former practice, and guaranteed the first three years of the physician's private practice income. Under a properly documented private practice income
guarantee that bore commercially reasonable terms, the hospital
guaranteed that during these first three years of the pediatrician's full-time practice in the service area, a certain level of net
income, after reasonable practice expenses, would be generated.
To the extent that the income level would not be generated, the
hospital would make up the difference. The amount of net income that the hospital guaranteed fell within the average income range of physicians in the same specialty as identified in
regional or national income surveys.

88.

26 U.S.C. § 217(b) (Supp. 1993).
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Situation Three
Like Hospital B, Hospital C, located in an economically depressed inner-city area, performed a community needs assessment. Its assessment indicated that indigent patients found it
difficult to access obstetrical care because of a shortage of obstetricians in the hospital's service area who were willing to treat
Medicaid and/or charity care patients. The hospital recruited an
obstetrician currently on Hospital C's medical staff, Physician 0,
for the purpose of providing these services. Hospital C and Physician 0 entered into a written agreement that was approved by
the hospital's board of directors (or its designees); no off-agreement incentives were provided.
Under the recruitment agreement, the hospital promised to
reimburse the obstetrician for one year of malpractice insurance
in exchange for Physician 0 treating a reasonable number of
Medicaid and charity care patients in that same year.
Situation Four .
Hospital D, in a medium- to large-sized metropolitan area,
operated a neonatal intensive care unit. A minimum of four
perinatologists was required in the unit to ensure proper coverage and high quality of care. Of the four perinatologists who
provided coverage for this neonatal intensive care unit, two
planned to relocate. Therefore, the hospital initiated a search
for perinatologists.
Physician P, one of the two top candidates for the position,
practiced in the same city, was a member of the medical staff of
a hospital located in that city, and provided coverage for that
hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. Physician P was not on
the medical staff of Hospital D. Hospital D recruited this physician to cover its neonatal intensive care unit and become a nonemployee member of its medical staff. Pursuant to a written
agreement that was negotiated at arm's length, Hospital D provided this perinatologist with a recruitment package; the agreement was approved by the board of directors of the hospital (or
its designees). No off-agreement incentives were provided.
The hospital guaranteed the level of the physician's private
practice income for a set period of time during which the physician was a member of the medical staff and provided neonatal
intensive care unit coverage. Specifically, under a properly documented private practice income guarantee that bore commercially reasonable terms, the hospital guaranteed that during the
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol4/iss1/3
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first three years of the perinatologist's practice, a certain level of
net income from his private practice, after reasonable expenses
of the practice, would be generated. To the extent that the income level would not be generated, the hospital would make up
the difference. The amount of net income that the hospital

guaranteed fell within the income range of physicians in the
same specialty as identified in regional or national income
surveys.
Situation Five

Hospital F, located in a medium- to large-sized metropolitan
area, was found guilty of knowingly and willfully violating the
Medicare and Medicaid Anti-kickback statute. 89 The hospital's

violation was based upon its substantial practice of providing
physician recruitment incentives that constituted referral

payments.
III.

DISCUSSION

As noted earlier, the proposed revenue ruling states that the
hospitals in Situations One, Two, Three, and Four did not violate
the requirements for exemption as an organization described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Code. All four of these situations involved the following common factors: (1) there was objective
evidence demonstrating a need for the particular physician's
specialty; (2) the recruitment incentive was evidenced by a written agreement with no off-agreement incentives provided; (3)
the agreement was negotiated at arm's length; (4) the agreement
was approved by the hospital's board of directors or its designees; and (5) the total compensation paid to each physician was
within a range of reasonableness for the particular physician's
specialty.
Income guarantees were permitted in Situations Two and
Four for the first three years covered under the agreement, as
opposed to the two-year limit imposed by the Guidelines. In
addition, it is significant that the income guarantees were allowed despite the fact that other incentives were provided to the
physician recruit. Unfortunately, the proposed revenue ruling
does not discuss the appropriate structure of the income guarantee agreement and does not specifically provide that repayment
is not required. Therefore, in the event periodic subsidies are to
89.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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be provided, the article's earlier discussion of periodic advances
under an income guarantee remains particularly relevant.
Situation Four is notable in that a recruitment incentive was
allowed by the IRS even though the physician was not a "permissible recruit" under the definition contained in the Guidelines. (Physician P already practiced in City Y where Hospital
D was located). 90 This is a significant concession on the part of
the IRS, which addressed "cross-town recruiting" negatively in
GCM 39,862 and the Guidelines.
Situation One is also interesting in that it allows the hospital
to guarantee the physician's mortgage on a personal residence
with no apparent limit on the amount and length of the guarantee, an incentive not addressed in the Guidelines.
By far the most intriguing of the five examples in the ruling is
Situation Five. The IRS has long struggled with charitable organizations that engage in activities that are "illegal." IRS agents
may enjoy using the potential illegality of an activity as a basis
for proposing revocation of tax-exempt status. While the fifth
example does recommend revocation of tax-exempt status based
on illegal activities, such recommendation was based on two
preconditions: (1) there must be an actual conviction under the
statute; and (2) the illegal activities must be substantial. 91 This is
consistent with section 501(c)(3) of the Code, which requires
charitable organizations to be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Because the statute is a "purposes"
test, the fact that a small number of activities may be illegal
should not result in revocation of exempt status unless the acts
are substantial in nature or so pervasive that the organization
serves an illegal purpose.
The consequences associated with illegal activities were discussed in GCM 34,631.92 In the memorandum, Chief Counsel
states:
If an organization carries on substantial illegal activities, it
cannot qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code.
To determine when disqualifying activities are present to a
"significant extent" (that is, when they become "substantial"),
90. See section IV(B) above.
91. Of interest, Situation Five of the proposed revenue ruling should be contrasted with the discussion of illegality contained in GCM 39,862, the "net revenue

stream." The discussion contained in Situation Five represents a more accurate statement of the law and answers questions posed by GCM 39,862.
92. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,631 (Oct. 4, 1971).
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more must be considered than the ratio they bear to activities
in furtherance of exempt purposes. The quality of such acts
are as important as their quantity. A great many violations of
local pollution regulations relating to a sizable percentage of
an organization's operations would be required to disqualify it
from 501(c)(3) exemption. Yet, if only .01% of its activities
were directed to robbing banks, it would not be exempt. This
is an example of an act having a substantial non-exempt quality, while lacking substantiality of amount.9 3
This position is also consistent with Rev. Rul. 75-384, 91 where
the IRS holds that a nonprofit organization formed
to promote world peace and disarmament by nonviolent direct
action and whose primary activity is the sponsoring of antiwar
protest demonstrations in which demonstrators are urged to
commit violations of local ordinances and breaches of public
order does not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3)
or (4) of the Code. 95
CONCLUSION

The issuance of the proposed revenue ruling should be viewed
as good news by the affected community. When used in conjunction with the Hermann Hospital Guidelines, the Hospital
Audit Guidelines, and the various GCMs and revenue rulings
discussed in this article, an exempt hospital should be able to
structure a recruitment program that is both effective and relatively safe from attack by the IRS. Two major principles to be
drawn from the various IRS pronouncements are that (1) the
overall compensation paid to a physician must be reasonable
and (2) recruitment packages should not be executed in a vacuum without the approval of the hospital's board or its
designees.
It is important that those who have comments respond to the
general request in the proposed revenue ruling. It is not often
the affected community is afforded the opportunity to provide
input into IRS positions. If significant comments are received in
a particular area, the IRS will likely pay heed to such comments.
Silence will be interpreted by the IRS as acceptance.

93. Id. at 12.
94. 1975-2 C.B. 204.
95. Id. at 204. (emphasis added).
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